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ABSTRACT 
Despite the onset of the current economic crisis there has been no significant move 
towards protectionism amongst most of the world’s economies. Although rational 
institutionalist explanations point to the role played by the constraining rules of the 
World Trade Organisation, countries have largely remained open in areas where they 
have not legally bound their liberalisation. While accounts emphasising the increasing 
interdependence of global supply chains have some merit, I show that such explanations 
do not tell the full story, as integration into the global economy is not always associated 
with support for free trade during the crisis. In response, I develop a constructivist 
argument which highlights how particular ideas about the global trading system have 
become rooted in policymaking discourse, mediating the response of policy elites to 
protectionist pressures and temptations. Trade policymakers and a group of leading 
economists have constructed an ideational imperative for continued openness (and for 
concluding the Doha Round, albeit less successfully) by drawing on a questionable 
reading of economic history (the Smoot-Hawley myth); by continually stressing 
protectionism’s role as one of the causes of the Great Depression non-liberal responses 
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to the current crisis have been all but ruled out by all except those willing to question 
the received wisdom. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Trade; World Trade Organisation; constructivism; protectionism; Great Depression; 
Financial Crisis. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008, and the ensuing economic recession, have had a 
considerable effect on world trade volumes. After almost a decade of practically 
uninterrupted increases in world merchandise and commercial services exports, these 
collapsed in 2009 by 22.3 and 9.1 per cent respectively on the previous year. Despite a 
recovery over 2010-11, exports have stagnated in 2012 (WTO, 2013a; see Figure 1). 
What is most significant from a political economy perspective is that the crisis slump in 
output has not been accompanied by a significant increase in trade barriers, despite 
much talk of the rise of ‘creeping’ ‘behind-the-border’ protectionism (e.g. Capling and 
Higgott, 2009; Erixon and Sally, 2010). Tariff levels have remained fairly stable, while 
the impact of a seemingly increasing number of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as 
quotas, import licensing or subsidies has also been limited (Gawande et al., 2011: 15-
18). Such developments surprised many of those who study trade policy from the 
perspective of standard public choice models. These accounts usually involve a pluralist 
view of state-society relations in which the state is the fighting ground for a large 
number of competing interests (see Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Due to collective 
action problems (Olson, 1965), protectionists are often seen to be more likely to 
mobilise and shape policy than the ‘winners’ from liberalisation, due to the concentrated 
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and more immediate nature of the losses incurred and the greater diffusion of the 
benefits. Such theories would thus postulate increased domestic demand for protection 
in times of economic downturn and high unemployment – as reduced demand in the 
domestic economy increases the adjustment costs resulting from imports (see, for 
example, Hanson, 1998: 57-8) – leading some authors to expect greater protectionism 
than actually materialised. In this vein, and echoing the views of others (see, for 
example, Kee et al., 2010: 1; Erixon and Sally, 2010: 12), Kishore Gawande et al. 
(2011: 2) noted that ‘[s]trikingly, despite the trade collapse, the 2008 crisis and its 
recessionary aftermath did not fuel protectionism’. 
 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
One possible explanation for this state of affairs is offered by what could be termed a 
‘rational institutionalist’ literature in the field of International Political Economy (IPE). 
This focuses on the role played by the wider global trading system. The argument is that 
international trading institutions – especially the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
its system of judicialised dispute-settlement – have legally ‘locked-in’ trade 
liberalisation, incentivising compliance with global trading rules. This explanation has 
also been commonly invoked in recent years to justify the conclusion of the current 
Doha Round of multilateral trade talks. The idea is that Doha would allow for additional 
policy binding to guard against the threat of protectionism (Hoekman et al., 2010). In 
this article, however, I show that such explanations overlook the fact that most countries 
have remained open in areas where they have not legally bound their liberalisation. 
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For their part, even when endogenous trade policy models have accorded a greater role 
to pro-liberalisation interest groups, this only partially accounts for the resilience of free 
trade. The argument here is that where trade liberalisation is undertaken on the basis of 
reciprocity, as in the WTO (e.g. Gilligan, 1997), the pressure exerted by those interested 
in liberalisation can offset the influence of protectionists. Applied to the current crisis 
the point is that given increasingly interconnected global supply chains the domestic 
demand for protection is outweighed by the interests of importers and exporters in 
avoiding retaliatory measures (Cattaneo et al., 2010; Gawande et al., 2011). While there 
is considerable merit to such an argument in terms of explaining why demand for 
protection was not as significant as may have been expected, it does not tell the full 
story. The maintenance of free trade was more widespread than the variable of global 
market integration might have suggested. Moreover, Argentina – a country strongly 
dependent on its export earnings and thus sensitive to retaliation from its trading 
partners – has bucked the general trend and introduced very visible and wide-ranging 
import restrictions since the start of the crisis. 
 
As a result, I argue that we need to complement such explanations with a perspective 
that focuses on the role of ideas in mediating elite responses to the crisis. More 
specifically, I develop a constructivist argument which emphasises how particular ideas 
about the global trading system have become rooted in policymaking discourse, with 
those bucking the trend choosing to reject the dominant view. Trade policymakers and a 
group of leading economists have contributed to constructing an ideational imperative 
for continued openness (and for concluding the Doha Round, albeit less successfully in 
this latter case given its continued stagnation) by drawing on a questionable reading of 
economic history (what I refer to as the Smoot-Hawley myth); by continually stressing 
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protectionism’s role as one of the causes of the Great Depression non-liberal responses 
to the current crisis have been all but ruled out by all except those willing to question 
the received wisdom. My aim in developing this argument is two-fold. For one, I 
challenge the dominant discourse about the WTO found in scholarly circles, which 
uncritically accepts the institution’s role in providing the supposed ‘public good’ of free 
trade. Secondly, I show how ideas, long neglected in the study of trade decision-
making, are crucial determinants of policy outcomes. In particular I suggest that we 
need to challenge the power inherent in a contestable reading of economic history. This 
serves to limit policy debates on international trade and entrench a limited range of 
responses, with my research pointing to the additional policy space that Argentina 
crafted for itself by explicitly rejecting the dominant discourse. 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the second section I review 
rational institutionalist explanations of free trade during the crisis, finding that their 
emphasis on the legally constraining effect of institutions cannot explain why most 
countries did not raise tariffs, use trade defence measures or introduce meaningful non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade when they had the leeway to do so. Similarly, while 
endogenous trade theory – with its emphasis on the role of global supply chains in 
mitigating the likelihood of protectionist pressures – does offer some insights, it is not a 
sufficient explanation of developments since the beginning of the crisis; integration into 
the global marketplace does not neatly correlate with support for free trade. In the third 
section, I therefore outline a constructivist account of trade policy which emphasises the 
importance of discourses of external constraint, in particular the so-called Smoot-
Hawley myth. In the fourth I trace how this idea – that the Great Depression was in 
large part caused and/or exacerbated by protectionism in the 1930s – has been invoked 
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since the collapse of Lehman brothers in September 2008 by diverse actors within the 
international trading system (in particular amongst the G20 and within the WTO). 
Combined with a consistent exaggeration of the extent of protectionism in public 
discourse, this has significantly contributed to rendering a protectionist response to the 
crisis unthinkable while strengthening the discursive armoury of those pushing for a 
conclusion to the Doha Round. In the fifth section I then underscore the importance of 
this myth by considering the case of Argentina, which chose to implement meaningful 
barriers to trade following the start of the crisis while articulating an alternative vision 
of trade-led development. I conclude in the final section, offering some thoughts on the 
importance of challenging the Smoot-Hawley myth. 
 
FREE TRADE DURING THE CRISIS 
One possible explanation for the resilience of free trade during the crisis is found in the 
standard neoliberal institutionalist literature that has been written about the WTO in 
IPE. The theoretical foundations for this approach are taken from Robert Keohane 
(1984), whose main point of contention was that international institutions (or ‘regimes’) 
could mitigate the effects of international anarchy even in the absence of a hegemon. 
Thus, Judith Goldstein et al. (2007) underscore how the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the WTO, have increased trade by emphasising 
their role in providing ‘institutional standing’ (establishing ‘rights and obligations’, 
even for non-members) and ‘institutional embeddedness’ (the fact that the GATT/WTO 
were/are embedded in a wider network of trade agreements and thus had/have effects 
beyond their membership). Adding to this literature, Edward Mansfield and Eric 
Reinhardt (2008) highlight how trade agreements – both preferential and multilateral – 
reduce volatility in international trade flows by committing members to pursuing free 
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trade policies. This, they emphasise, increases trade flows between members of such 
institutions which ‘constrain member-states from introducing new trade barriers [...] 
[and, among other things,] foster policy transparency and convergence in expectations, 
standards and policy instruments’ (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008: 622). The wider IPE 
literature on the role of international trading institutions similarly emphasises the 
importance of a rules-based regime in constraining the policy options available to 
policymakers, particularly in the face of the WTO’s judicialised dispute settlement 
mechanism (e.g. Howse and Nicolaïdis, 2003; Barton et al., 2012). As Lisa Martin and 
Beth Simmons (1998: 746) highlight, international institutions ‘lock in a particular 
equilibrium, providing stability’. In this manner, trade regimes are seen to skew the 
preferences of states towards cooperation by providing an appropriate institutional 
environment to overcome coordination or time-inconsistency problems (Bagwell and 
Staiger, 1999; Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, 1998) and by providing for transparency 
mechanisms to monitor compliance (Abbott, 2000; Collins-Williams and Wolfe, 2010). 
 
Scholars have applied such arguments to the current context in order to justify the 
conclusion of the Doha Round of multilateral trading talks. Thus, economists such as 
Bernard Hoekman et al. (2010: 505) argue that ‘[t]he Doha Round must be concluded 
not because it will produce dramatic liberalisation but because it will create greater 
security of market access’. Several IPE scholars have agreed with these conclusions, 
stressing the importance of concluding the Round as a means of resisting ‘murky 
protectionism’ in the form of NTBs which are subject to far less extensive legal 
constraints than tariffs (Capling and Higgott, 2009: 314; for a similar argument, see also 
Collins-Williams and Wolfe, 2010). The theme is echoed in a related economic 
literature. This has sought to underscore the value of tariff and policy bindings – in 
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other words, legally enshrined commitments not to raise tariffs or introduce other trade 
restrictive measures – in reducing trade volatility and trade protection. It has thus 
formalised some of the arguments raised in the IPE literature regarding the importance 
of international trading institutions (see, amongst others, Francois and Martin, 2004; 
Cadot et al., 2008; Sala et al., 2010; Bachetta and Piermantini, 2011).  
 
Here lies the Achilles heel of such approaches when it comes to explaining the current 
resilience of free trade. As Table 1 highlights, the difference between average applied 
MFN tariffs and average bound tariffs (‘water’ or binding overhang) has remained fairly 
constant for practically all economies that had such wiggle room in the first place over 
the period of the crisis (predominantly developing countries). Moreover, several 
countries have maintained consistently high ‘water’ levels. In the absence of a 
multilateral trade agreement, this implies that countries have not made use of the 
considerable legal wiggle room that they have had to raise tariffs. 
 
While tariffs have clearly not significantly increased, a number of commentators have 
pointed to the rise of ‘behind-the-border’ protectionism – where even greater discretion 
is afforded to WTO members than for ‘traditional’ protectionism in tariffs (e.g. Erixon 
and Sally, 2010: 13-15; Capling and Higgott, 2009). This appears to be confirmed by 
data from the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database, which counts the total number of 
trade restrictions imposed from November 2008 onwards. GTA data showed that up 
until June 2012 only 36 per cent of measures introduced by states were tariffs (including 
trade defence), with the single largest proportion of measures (27 per cent) being bail 
out/state aid measures (Evenett, 2011: 28; Evenett, 2012: 37). There are, however, 
grounds to conclude that the picture being painted by some of a threat from ‘creeping 
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protectionism’ (Erixon and Sally, 2010) is exaggerated. Despite what appears to be an 
increase in the number of NTBs introduced by states since the start of the crisis – a 
trend that cannot be entirely verified as no comprehensive data on NTBs before the 
crisis exists (Gawande et al. 2011: 17) – this has hardly been sustained. Data from the 
GTA database itself suggests that the number of new trade restrictions (including 
tariffs) imposed every quarter seems to be on declining trend after a spike in early 2009 
(see Figure 2). More significantly, the GTA counting exercise overstates the extent of 
protectionism by simply aggregated the total number of restrictions, failing to determine 
the extent of their effect on trade flows (the only assessment being made as to their 
effect is whether they are discriminatory or not).  
 
In support of this argument there is data to suggest that the impact of these measures has 
actually been quite limited. An IMF study found that protectionist measures of any kind 
implemented up to April 2010 – which covers the spike identified in the GTA report for 
the imposition of discriminatory trade measures (see Figure 2) – only lead to a 
contraction of global trade of 0.2 per cent (Henn and McDonald, 2011: 33-4). Indeed, if 
we turn to the trade barriers established by the Group of 20 (G20) leading economies – 
who have often been depicted as the main culprits of ‘crisis-era protectionism’ (see, for 
example, Evenett, 2012) – the findings are that trade barriers have affected very few 
products (see also Henn and McDonald, 2011: 5): the cumulative percentage of G20 
imports affected by any form of import restriction put in place from October 2008 until 
Mid-May 2012 has been reported as 3.8 per cent (WTO et al., 2012: 10).1 All in all, this 
data is hardly indicative of the major resurgence of protectionism via NTBs often 
attributed to the G20. Combined with the findings in Table 1 relating the stability of 
tariffs, such developments challenge the neoliberal institutionalist and economic 
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accounts which attribute a legally constraining role to institutions; free trade has been 
surprisingly resilient despite the (relative) absence of legal constraints.  
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
[insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
One possible (and still rationalist) explanation for this state of affairs is offered by a 
group of economists in a study published by the World Bank in October 2011. Noting a 
similar pattern to that depicted in Table 1 of consistently high ‘water’ in the tariff rates 
of a significant number of countries, Gawande and his colleagues (2011: 28) argue that 
while institutional constraints have had some effect, the determining factor has been 
‘the position of domestic and foreign exporters in the global supply chain [...] [which] 
exert[ed] countervailing pressure against protectionism’ (for a similar argument, see 
also Cattaneo et al., 2010). In other words, the increasing degree of vertical 
specialisation in global production – which has fragmented production chains – has 
meant that downstream producers and exporters have had the political and economic 
clout to lobby successfully for continued trade openness against the pressure of import-
competing firms. Such an explanation, which draws on endogenous trade theory and its 
emphasis on the balance of domestic interests, bears some similarity to those 
emphasising the deterrent effects of retaliatory protectionism (e.g. Gawande and 
Hansen, 1999) as well as to ‘Listian’ political economy arguments (e.g. Chang, 2002; 
Weiss, 2005). In both cases, a higher level of economic development could be expected 
to make a country more susceptible to support free trade – either because it is 
sufficiently competitive (as in the Listian approach) or because its integration into the 
global economy means that it is fearful of tit-for-tat market closures. This fits with 
11 
 
 
Gawande et al.’s (2011) choice of tariff data, which is drawn from seven emerging 
economies (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Turkey and South Africa). 
Moreover, the increased prominence of pro-liberalisation interests in global trade helps 
to explain why demand for protectionism during the crisis was not as significant as may 
have been expected – as is suggested by the comparatively low incidence of trade 
defence measures in most of the world, which are usually initiated by interest group 
action (Bown, 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, such an explanation is still incomplete. The data compiled in Table 1 
shows that the phenomenon of stable ‘high water’ levels is not unique to emerging 
economies that are members of the G20, but rather also characterises developing 
countries at all levels of the spectrum (from LDCs to upper-middle income countries; 
see Table 1). In a similar vein, while the evidence suggests that the impact of NTBs has 
been generally quite limited (see above), it also shows that this is especially so for less 
developed economies (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa), which account for a very 
small proportion of those measures that have been adopted (Evenett, 2010, 2012). Given 
that the absence of meaningful protectionism during the crisis has been incredibly 
widespread, it may be said that the level of integration into the global marketplace is not 
a sufficient indicator of support for free trade. Underscoring this finding, Argentina (one 
of the countries featured in Gawande et al.’s study) has gone against the general trend, 
restricting a wide range of imports since the beginning of the crisis through the use of 
import licensing and other measures despite its reliance on export earnings and resultant 
vulnerability to retaliatory action. 
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This is not to say that the authors of the above study are fundamentally wrong in 
pointing to the changing nature of the domestic politics of trade liberalisation wrought 
by globalised supply chains. Indeed, there is evidence that to suggest that pro-
liberalisation interest groups have gained significant influence in trade policymaking, 
such that the process need not necessarily privilege protectionist interests as in the 
standard public choice literature. Recent studies have pointed not only to the importance 
of exporter interests (e.g. Dür, 2010), but also to the role of importers in pushing for 
trade liberalisation (e.g. Heron, 2007; De Bièvre and Eckhardt, 2011) – echoing the 
arguments made by Gawande and his colleagues. Rather, what the findings in this 
section suggest – that free trade policies have been maintained by economies at all 
levels of development (which are integrated to varying degrees into the global 
marketplace) but also flouted by Argentina, where the balance of rationally-determined 
interests supposedly lies elsewhere – is that we need to complement such explanations 
with an approach that takes on board the neglected dimension of ideas. In other words, 
ideas determine whether political elites perceive and act upon protectionist pressures or 
temptations. While they may have rendered such a reaction unthinkable in most of the 
world, exceptions to the general rule can be explained with reference to the adoption of 
different policy ideas. 
 
DECONSTRUCTING TRADE DISCOURSE: THE BICYCLE METAPHOR 
AND THE SMOOT-HAWLEY MYTH 
My aim in this third section is to map out a constructivist approach to explaining the 
resilience of free trade during the crisis, pointing to the important role of ideas in 
structuring social reality. Using the term constructivism evokes a tradition in 
International Relations (IR) theory mostly associated with the writings of Alexander 
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Wendt (1999) or John Ruggie (1982). In this vein, scholars have recently sought to 
reconceptualise the international trade regime in terms of an ‘intersubjective 
communication among participants’ (Wolfe, 2005: 340; see also Lang, 2006, 2007). 
Such a perspective is useful to the extent that it recasts international institutions as being 
constituted by ideas. However, it also inherits Wendt’s (1999: 130-1, 136) ‘rump 
materialism’ and embraces important aspects of the neo-neo synthesis, most importantly 
its central problématique of explaining inter-state cooperation (for a similar critique, see 
Hay, 2002: 199-200). 
 
I therefore recast constructivism as an ontologically-consistent framework based on the 
premise that ideas do matter all the way down (in contrast to Wendt). Moreover, rather 
than being constituted at the level of state interaction, it is agents themselves which 
construct social reality. But what is social construction? Quoting Ian Hacking (1999: 6-
12), Colin Hay’s (2002: 201) argument is that X is socially constructed when: 
 
 In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable. 
 X need not have existed, or need not be as it is. X, or X as it is present, is not 
determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. 
 
This leaves me with an intuitive ontological position on which to base the 
constructivism in this article: the belief that social and political reality is constructed by 
agents through ideas rather than being fixed by particular material constraints, as in 
rationalist accounts. This is not to say that material factors do not exist or matter, but 
rather that, in a social context, what is decisive is how they are interpreted by relevant 
actors. Thus, although there may be material constraints to action, what is ultimately the 
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determining factor is how an actor responds to these. This is what according to Emanuel 
Adler (1997) could be called the ‘middle ground’ between rationalism – where ideas are 
best adjunct to material forces – and ‘interpretivist’ approaches (such as post-
structuralism or the Frankfurt School) – where it is only ideas that matter. Making the 
case for such a constructivism, Adler (1997: 324) argues that ‘collective understandings, 
such as norms, endow physical objects with purpose and therefore help constitute 
reality’. This shows how (as I have suggested above) constructivism can complement 
the insights of endogenous trade theory, with ideas mediating and defusing the way 
policy elites respond to domestic (interest group) pressure. 
 
Applying this framework to the present case, my aim is to move beyond focusing on the 
rationally given interests of states within the international trade regime (as in the 
neoliberal institutionalist literature) or on its ideational constitution via ‘intersubjective 
communication among participants’ in a Wendtian sense. Instead, I focus on the process 
of social construction as it applies beyond the constitution of the international trading 
system. That is, of course, not to say that international institutions themselves are not 
social constructions – as the Wendt and Ruggie-inspired literature is right to suggest. 
But I go beyond the study of these institutions (which are themselves obviously 
important venues for the articulation of ideas) to the study of particular ideas as 
expressed by agents and their impact on social and political outcomes. Indeed, Stephen 
Bell (2012: 7-8) – who also makes the case for an agent-centred constructivism – argues 
that we should not simply ‘conflate’ institutions with ideas, as the former ‘have 
properties that help structure thought and behavior at one remove from the immediacy 
of thought or action by agents at any given point in time’. One final reason for moving 
beyond Wendtian constructivism is that, as Hay (2002: 201) suggests, one is making an 
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important normative claim in arguing that something is socially constructed (in that one 
is envisaging preferable alternatives to current circumstances). In this vein, my aim in 
this article is be ‘critical’ and move beyond the ‘problem-solving’ (to use Cox’s [1981] 
terminology) problématique of the neo-neo synthesis inherited by Wendt, whose 
normative orientation is towards sustaining the current order of inter-state cooperation. 
 
This suggests that it may be fruitful to consider a literature that has concerned itself with 
the discursive construction of globalisation as an economic constraint. This takes as its 
point of departure the debate between advocates of the ‘hyperglobalisation thesis’ and 
its skeptics. Rather than accepting the parameters of this rationalist argument – that is to 
say, entering into a debate over whether globalisation is an empirically verifiable 
material process that restricts the choices facing political actors – such writers adopt the 
constructivist view that it is the ideas that agents hold (and invoke) about ‘globalisation’ 
that are key (see, among others, Rosamond, 1999, 2002; Hay and Rosamond, 2002; Hay 
and Smith, 2010; Watson and Hay, 2003). In a seminal article, Colin Hay and Ben 
Rosamond (2002: 148, emphasis in the original) quite effectively condense the central 
argument of this approach, noting that ‘policymakers acting on the basis of assumptions 
consistent with the hyperglobalisation thesis may well serve, in so doing, to bring about 
outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its veracity and, indeed, irrespective 
of its perceived veracity.’ The perceived material rationality of the hyperglobalisation 
thesis becomes meaningful in shaping outcomes only because it is treated by them as 
though it were a real, material constraint rather than just a (contestable) economic 
framework. The key to understanding this process is a study of what this literature terms 
‘globalisation discourse’. Here discourse is defined as ‘a broad[…] matrix of social 
practices that gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their 
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behaviour. […] More precisely, a discourse makes “real” that which it prescribes as 
meaningful’ (George, 1994: 29-30, emphasis in the original). Analysing discourse thus 
becomes the study of the process of social construction, focusing on the nexus between 
power and knowledge. Such a framework stresses the fact that power is being exercised 
when such discourses are invoked, borrowing from the critical approach of Robert Cox 
(1981). The power of such rhetorics thus resides in that they present a (politically) 
contingent phenomenon as immutable (economic) fact. Moreover, it also underscores 
the often ‘coercive’ nature of ideas that some have claimed has often been absent from 
political analysis. The argument is that regardless of whether a particular set of ideas 
has been internalised by one’s political opponents, these ‘can prove critical to success in 
political contests’ by ‘leav[ing] their opponents without access to the rhetorical 
materials needed to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal’ (Krebs and Jackson, 2007: 36).  
 
Whereas much work on discourses of economic constraint has focused on the 
invocation of current processes as constraining policy choices – e.g. globalisation or 
indeed the necessity to meet competitiveness objectives (Siles-Brügge, 2011; Menz, 
2009) – what is interesting in the case of trade policy is that similar discourses have 
often had a historical dimension. In other words, rather than just stressing the 
inevitability of contemporaneous process, such discourses have drawn on a contestable 
historical interpretation to draw an analogy to the present. One such discourse is 
highlighted by Susan Strange (1985: esp. 239-42), who seeks to expose it as a ‘myth’. 
This is the idea, common among liberal economists and scholars of IPE, that the global 
Great Depression of the 1930s was, if not caused by trade protection, certainly 
exacerbated by it as countries short-sightedly pursued ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies. 
These, so the conventional argument goes, led to a significant decline in world trade in 
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manufactures with dire consequences for the global economy. It could be termed the 
‘Smoot-Hawley myth’, in ‘honour’ of the two United States (US) legislators who 
attached their names to the infamous protectionist bill passed by the Congress in 1930 
and which is often depicted as the catalyst for subsequent protectionism. Strange 
challenges this myth by invoking the evidence collected by several economic historians, 
arguing that the collapse of world trade and the rise of protectionism was a symptom 
rather than a cause of worldwide economic collapse. To this effect she cites not only the 
perhaps more heterodox development economist Arthur Lewis (1949) but also one of 
the doyens of the realist school of IPE Charles Kindleberger (1973), both of whom 
argued that tariffs had a ‘minimal’ effect on ‘the volume of world trade or to its 
direction’ (Strange, 1985: 239-40). One other influential ‘myth’ that Strange (1985: 
241-2) tackles is what she refers to as the ‘bicycle theory’, the idea that ‘if you do not 
keep up the momentum of trade liberalization [of multilateral trade rounds], disaster 
will follow’.  
 
This particular discourse has also been critiqued more recently by Rorden Wilkinson 
(2009, 2012), although he uses the term ‘metaphor’ to convey the manner in which such 
ideas are used to inculcate a discursive ‘common sense’. Wilkinson’s aim, not unlike 
Strange’s, is to expose this metaphor as false. But more importantly than that, he also 
seeks to explore ‘the way in which the discourse has been deployed as a means of 
reframing trade negotiations in such a way that the likelihood of their continuation and 
ultimate conclusion increases’ (Wilkinson, 2009: 597). These ideas are thus powerful 
instruments used by trade policymaking elites – in particular those with close ties to the 
US – in order to further their interest in concluding the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
talks. Although Strange (1985: 234) also acknowledges a strategic dimension in her 
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discussion of ‘crisis discourse’ – in that it serves those with a ‘vested professional or 
ideological interest in it’ to warn of its imminent collapse – her underlying argument is 
that ‘the system of rules which people (still, alas) refer to as a regime is of little 
moment’. The Smoot-Hawley myth and the bicycle theory, in her views, are red 
herrings, which distract from the underlying features of the global political economy. In 
this article, unsurprisingly, I take a view closer to Wilkinson’s approach in highlighting 
the power that such ideas hold, whether we see them as instruments or repositories of 
political power. 
 
From the discussion above, we arrive at two particular discourses that may be of 
particular relevance today in legitimating free trade outcomes in the face of protectionist 
pressures: the Smoot-Hawley myth – which attributes the cause of the Great Depression 
to trade protectionism – and the bicycle metaphor – which argues that sustained 
multilateral liberalisation is necessary to avoid a descent into protectionism. To a large 
extent both discourses are, of course, entwined. The argument expounded in the 
conventional economic/IPE literature on value of concluding the Doha Round in terms 
of its ability to bind current levels of trade openness in the context of an economic 
recession (e.g. Hoekman et al., 2010) clearly resonates on both counts. Wilkinson 
(2009: 602-6) indeed writes of a ‘crisis discourse’ which underpins the bicycle 
metaphor – taking hold during the postwar period – and which drew on the memory of 
Smoot-Hawley to spur liberalisation against domestic and international pressure. In this 
article, however, I choose to differentiate between both for two interrelated reasons. 
From a more abstract, analytical perspective it makes sense to draw distinctions 
between both discourses as they have served different functions and have originated in 
different discursive contexts. Thus, the Smoot-Hawley myth had its origins in the 
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immediate aftermath of the Great Depression in US trade policymaking circles; as 
Goldstein (1988: 187) notes of this myth, which she herself accepts as fact, ‘[t]he failure 
of the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1929-30 to deal with economic decline set up a 
policymaking crisis. The delegitimization of protectionism forced the political 
community to search for an alternative theoretical approach to explain past errors and 
provide guidelines for future behavior’. The bicycle metaphor, for its part, had its 
origins in the 1970s ‘after serious impediments to further liberalization began to 
emerge’ in the form of an increasingly intricate GATT and negotiating agenda, and 
given the economic crises of the period (Wilkinson, 2009: 605). Secondly, and applying 
this analytical insight to the puzzle at hand – why free trade has been so resilient since 
the start of the crisis – it makes sense in this article to focus on the latter form of 
discourse. Indeed, the fact that protectionism has not been brought about despite the 
advent of the crisis and despite the stagnation of the Doha Round – bicycle metaphor 
notwithstanding – suggest why this latter discourse may have become more prevalent in 
recent years (see also Wilkinson, 2012: 4). In this vein, Amin Samman (2012: 219-21) 
has highlighted how the Smoot-Hawley myth has become an important part of the 
global narration of the crisis. 
 
My aim in this article is thus to map the Smoot-Hawley myth in contemporary 
discussions of trade policy and to begin to consider its wider effect on participants in 
international trade discussions. Clearly, this raises questions as to whether such 
discourses are being invoked strategically or simply being internalised by actors, as this 
has some bearing on the nature of ideas (in other words, they may be either instruments 
used to exercise power or repositories of power, or both). This is beset by what Hay and 
Rosamond (2002: 165) term and ‘inherent’ and ‘intractable’ dilemma in the study of 
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public discourses. The problem, in a nutshell, is that one cannot determine from an 
actor’s pronouncement per se whether a particular idea is being invoked strategically (as 
they could be simply repeating an idea they have internalised) or whether it has been 
internalised (as they could also be reciting the idea for strategic purposes). Whereas 
some authors have carried out in-depth empirical work to determine the strategic use of 
discourse (e.g. Hay and Smith, 2010; Siles-Brügge, 2011), this is unfortunately beyond 
the scope of this article. Moreover, it is clear that the idea itself has had an effect on the 
behaviour of actors even if we cannot – at least at this stage – entirely disentangle the 
strategic invocation of such ideas from internalisation effects. Indeed, as Ronald Krebs 
and Patrick Jackson (2007: 41-8) show, in situations of ‘rhetorical coercion’ the 
isolation or ruling out of alternative accounts is itself very significant in shaping 
political action and outcomes, even if we cannot be sure of the underlying beliefs (and 
motives) of actors. 
 
Before turning to the empirical discussion in this article, it is worth underscoring why 
the term ‘myth’ is used to refer to the central discourse under consideration. Firstly, it is 
intended to convey the power associated with a particular historical narrative (as 
highlighted above). Indeed, there is a large literature that has pointed to the importance 
of such ‘myths’ in the constitution of nation-states and other polities (e.g. Anderson, 
1991; Archard, 1995; Bell, 2003; Della Sala, 2010). Such authors have often sought to 
portray myths as serving ‘cognitive’, ‘emotive’ and ‘practical’ purposes (Bottici and 
Challand, 2006: 322; see also Archard, 1995: 472). Myths, in other words, ‘are mapping 
devices through which we look at the world, feel about it and therefore also act within it 
as a social group’ (Bottici and Challand, 2006: 321). Crucially, this literature has 
suggested that such myths are not only not falsifiable (Sorel, 1990), but rather that it is 
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not useful to equate myth with falsehood as in much popular discourse (see, in 
particular, Bell, 2008: 151). Instead, what is being suggested is that their veracity (or 
not) is incidental to the power they hold over actors who lack the rhetorical means of 
challenging them. This latter insight is a very useful one which I draw on in this article.  
 
However, I do make a significant departure from the treatment of myth in this literature 
by using it to problematise a particular understanding of the history of global trade; in 
other words, what I am suggesting is that the term myth be used to point to the at best 
contested, at worst dubious content of a particular discourse. As the passage from 
Hacking (1999) quoted from above highlights, it is important – in underscoring the 
constructed nature of social reality – to highlight how ‘X need not have existed’. In 
other words, to paint something as a social construction requires one to formulate 
alternatives. Moreover, in doing so, one is engaged in a ‘critical’ exercise of challenging 
dominant understandings. Whereas there is no space here to completely deconstruct the 
Smoot-Hawley myth, there are clear grounds to challenge the accuracy of its historical 
interpretation. While some economists have sought to argue that the macroeconomic 
effect of tariffs during the Great Depression was significant (leading, among other 
things to escalating tariff wars) (e.g. Crucini and Kahn, 1996), the consensus among 
economists and economic historians has been to challenge this interpretation, despite its 
prevalence in public discourse (as Strange’s article suggested, see above). As perhaps 
one of the foremost exponents of this view, Douglas Irwin (1998: 333) has calculated 
that Smoot-Hawley only increased tariffs by an average of around 20 per cent. His 
conclusion is that while deflationary price shocks may have been significant, ‘Smoot-
Hawley itself appears to have been a very small direct shock to trade and therefore, it is 
likely, to the economy at large’ (Irwin, 1998: 333; see also Irwin, 2011: Ch 2; Irwin, 
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2012: 15-16). Moreover, it only ‘played a modest role in the spread of protectionism 
and the collapse of world trade in the early 1930s’ (Irwin, 2012: 18), while the 
incidence of other measures such as quotas and exchange controls during this period 
was driven by instability in the financial system rather than protectionist pressures.2 
Similar conclusions are mirrored in a number of other econometric studies (e.g. 
Eichengreen, 1986; Hayford and Pasurka, 1991). In sum, using the term myth serves to 
highlight the power that this contestable idea ultimately holds in the international 
trading system. 
 
THE SMOOT-HAWLEY MYTH IN ACTION (2008-2012) 
The Smooth-Hawley myth has played a key role in legitimating free trade policies 
following the Financial Crisis, with near universal acceptance among leading world 
economic decision-makers in the G20 leading economies (with the notable exception of 
Argentina, see below) and WTO. What is interesting is that prior to the crisis, such 
actors invoked very different ideas about the multilateral trading system. The 
communiqué from the 2006 G20 summit in Melbourne, for instance, appeared to echo 
the bicycle metaphor when it stressed that ‘[t]he success of the Doha Development 
Round is essential to securing freer, more open trade, reducing the risk of economic and 
financial instability and achieving faster economic growth [etc...]’ (G20, 2006: 1). In a 
similar vein, Pascal Lamy’s interventions as Secretary General during the period 
immediately preceding the crisis (2005-7) tended to exclusively invoke the bicycle 
metaphor (e.g. Lamy, 2005a,b, 2006, 2007).  
 
The discourse, however, was to change among policymakers, especially following the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank – widely seen to be the point at which 
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the brewing subprime mortgage crisis in the US escalated to become a worldwide 
financial meltdown (Germain, 2010: 70-2). Among the G20, metaphorical alarm bells 
were rung as early as November 2008 (only two months after the collapse of Lehman) 
when the leaders of the world’s leading economies met for their first summit in 
Washington, DC.3 Among the issues on the agenda was the issue of ‘committing to an 
open global economy’. The final summit communiqué was very explicit in this regard, 
with G20 members 
 
underscor[ing] the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning 
inward in times of financial uncertainty. In this regard, within the next 12 
months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in 
goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World 
Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports (G20, 
2008). 
 
This statement is quite significant for two reasons. First of all, rejecting protectionism 
was argued to be of ‘critical importance [...] in times of financial uncertainty’, clearly 
echoing the experience Great Depression of the 1930s, which itself had roots in the 
financial turmoil experienced at the time. In this vein, Table 2 shows how the Smoot-
Hawley discourse has become a common feature of G20 summit declarations. There has 
been at least an implicit reference to protectionism in the context of the Depression in 
most of the leaders’ communiqués, with a clear correlation (as implied by the Smoot-
Hawley myth and its interpretation of economic history) being drawn between trade 
protection and economic stagnation or collapse. Moreover, some of the references have 
been quite explicit. Thus, at the London summit, leaders agreed that they ‘[would] not 
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repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism’ (G20, 2009a). Secondly, the excerpt from 
the Washington summit communiqué cited above contained a formal commitment from 
policymakers – from practically the beginning of the worldwide economic recession we 
should not forget – to not implement new trade barriers. This ‘standstill pledge’ would 
be extended until the end of 2010 at the London G20 summit in April 2009. It was then 
reaffirmed at Pittsburgh (September 2009) and subsequently extended until the end of 
2013 at Toronto (June 2010), with this extension of the pledge being reaffirmed at Seoul 
(November 2010) and Cannes (November 2011) and again extended at Los Cabos (June 
2012) until 2014. Moreover, at London the standstill pledge was expanded to include a 
commitment to ‘rollback’: G20 members undertook to ‘rectify promptly any such 
measures’ that they imposed (G20, 2009a).  
 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
 
These pledges would appear, at first sight, to substantiate an institutionalist argument 
about the resilience of free trade. Not only were these a form of international 
cooperation but they also entailed quasi-legal pre-commitments to liberal trade policies 
that were to be monitored by the WTO, the OECD and UNCTAD (as agreed at the 
London G20 summit). However, although Terry Collins-Williams and Robert Wolfe 
(2010: 551) credit this ‘[e]nhanced monitoring and surveillance of emergency measures 
[as] […] central to the international effort to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis’, 
their own paper reports that the WTO’s overall monitoring record is patchy at best. This 
is, in large part, due to the reliance on self-reporting, with only those bodies within the 
WTO having clearly defined reporting arrangements yielding promising outcomes 
(Collins-Williams and Wolfe, 2011: 572-4). This problem also besets the specific 
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reporting arrangements for the G20 pledge, as they are governed by nothing more than a 
undertaking to ‘notify promptly the WTO of any such measures’ (G20, 2009a). Indeed, 
Collins-Williams and Wolfe (2011: 577) note that these reports ‘are hampered by the 
failure of governments to notify more’. In this article I therefore suggest that what 
matters is not so much the quasi-legal pledge itself, and its role in shaping the rational 
expectations of actors, but rather the discursive context of which it is symptomatic, 
where free trade is seen as the only possible response to the crisis. 
 
The G20 summits have been perhaps the most high profile instance of the prevalence of 
this discourse among trade policymaking circles. However, it is also commonplace in 
the statements of key WTO figures. First and foremost among them has been its current 
Director-General, Pascal Lamy. Following the collapse of Lehman brothers in 
September 2008, Lamy was to make a series of four speeches in quick succession (24 
September, 27 October, 29 October and 3 November) in which he explicitly invoked the 
‘Smoot-Hawley’ myth (Lamy 2008a,b,c,d). Thus, on 24 September Lamy (2008a), 
addressing the WTO Public Forum, was to stress that ‘one of the important lessons of 
the Great Depression, which we must not forget, is that “protectionism” and economic 
isolationism do not work’. On 27 October, the reference to the Smoot-Hawley myth was 
even more explicit in a speech Lamy was to give at Stanford University: 
 
The notorious Smoot-Hawley Act sharply raised already high US tariffs, 
triggered retaliatory measures by trading partners and led to a two-thirds 
contraction in the value of global trade. This trade contraction deepened the 
Great Depression which pushed the US jobless rate to 25%. It also shaped the 
thinking of the visionaries who created the post-World War II system of 
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multilateralism. Never again would the world lurch toward blinkered beggar-
thy-neighbour trade policies that did so much to destabilise the world in the 
1930s (Lamy, 2008b). 
 
The same can be said of a speech he subsequently gave on 29 October, where Lamy 
(2008c) stressed how ‘Smoot-Hawley touched off a domino effect of retaliation and 
counter-retaliation among trading partners which provoked a severe contraction of 
international trade, depressed growth and rising unemployment [sic] around the 
industrial world’. Figure 3 suggests how references to the Great Depression – and by 
extension to the Smoot-Hawley myth – have become a consistent feature of the 
discourse of the Secretary-General since a peak in 2008 (there were a total of 8 
references that year to the ‘Depression’ in his public speeches, all occurring after the 
collapse of Lehman in September), after not featuring whatsoever in his 
pronouncements in either 2006 or 2007.  
 
[insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
The Smoot-Hawley discourse has, at the same time, also been prominent in more day-
to-day WTO discussions. Delegations in the WTO General Council were quick to 
invoke the spectre of the Great Depression after the crisis took on a global (and 
increasingly hysterical) dimension in the autumn of 2008. At the first General Council 
meeting held since the collapse of Lehman in October 2008, many delegations explicitly 
invoked the memory of Smoot-Hawley to call for the continued maintenance of free 
trade (WTO, 2008a). Several delegations were also keen to endorse the standstill and 
rollback commitments of the G20. At the May 2009 General Council meeting of the 
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WTO a number of members – largely from non-G20 developed and emerging 
economies – called on their fellow WTO members to also take on the G20 
commitments, invoking the spectre of the Great Depression to legitimate their policy 
prescription (WTO, 2009a).4 In the subsequent discussion within the General Council, 
the initiative was widely welcomed with current G20 members and the Least Developed 
Country group (led by Tanzania), among others, stressing the importance of continued 
rejection of protectionism on the grounds that this threatened the recovery (WTO, 
2009b).5 
 
At an even lower level of policymaking, the trade policy review process of the WTO – 
whose aim is to review the trade policies of WTO members for consistency with the 
organisation’s rules and principles – has been the venue for the consistent repetition of 
this myth by delegations of both developed and developing nations. For instance, in 
reviewing the EU’s trade policy response to the crisis in September 2011, the St Lucian 
delegation was echoing the sentiments of very many other delegations when it 
highlighted that ‘the difficult lessons of the great depression have been learnt and that 
the EU has not engaged in wholesale tit-for-tat protectionism’ (WTO, 2011a: 53; see 
also WTO, 2010a: 17; WTO, 2010b: 1). Although the St Lucian delegation went on to 
subsequently criticise the EU for its system of agricultural subsidies under the Common 
Agricultural Policy (as did indeed other developing countries), this does not detract 
from the argument that the Smoot-Hawley discourse appears to be strongly embedded 
in trade policymakers discourse when discussing the on-going crisis. Thus, even though 
the Trade Policy Review process has often been derided by participants as largely a 
‘talking shop’6 – simply leading to the reproduction of rehearsed policy positions and 
beset by the more general problem’s of WTO surveillance mechanisms (Collins-
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Williams and Wolfe, 2010) – the fact remains that it is a venue for the repetition of a 
discourse of considerable staying power and near universal acceptance. 
 
Exaggerating the threat of protectionism and the need to conclude Doha 
One aspect of the Smoot-Hawley crisis discourse has been the fact that the extent of 
(and by extension, the threat posed by) global protectionism has been consistently 
exaggerated by a group of influential economists.7 Foremost among these have been 
Richard Baldwin and Simon Evenett (both of the Centre for Economic Policy Research 
[CEPR] and then also, respectively, of the Graduate Institute, Geneva, and of the 
University of St Gallen), who in December 2008 edited an ebook on What World 
Leaders Must do to Halt the Spread of Protectionism (published by VoxEU).8 This 
included contributions from the likes of Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya, Gary 
Hufbauer or Jeffrey Schott – all well-known advocates of the multilateral trading 
system and, more broadly, of free trade. The following excerpt from Baldwin’s 
contribution is particularly significant, as it highlights not only the centrality of the 
Smoot-Hawley myth to these economists’ discourse, but also the explicit purpose of 
their intervention – to restate the logical necessity of continued trade openness (this 
passage was also replicated, in an abridged form, on the back cover as a form of 
synopsis).  
 
The futility of protectionism in a global recession is not a new lesson – every 
world leader knows the morality tale of protectionism in the Great Depression. 
But leaders find themselves in ageless ‘two brain’ situation. Their intuitive ‘right 
brain’ hears the cries of workers losing jobs and firm-owners losing money; 
protectionism feels like a natural reaction. Their logical ‘left brain’, however, 
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knows that protectionism in a global slowdown is a self-defeating tactic. The 
challenge facing world leaders is to find mechanisms that help them mutually 
commit to doing the right thing (Baldwin, 2008: 32).  
 
The threat posed by protectionism was more explicitly addressed in another edited 
collection published shortly afterwards in March 2009 (again in ebook form, so as to 
encourage circulation, and again featuring contributions from leading trade economists), 
entitled The Collapse of Global Trade, Murky Protectionism and the Crisis. Its 
argument was that ‘[p]rotectionist forces have already emerged and will strengthen as 
the recession gets worse. […] Governments’ crisis-fighting measures have spawned 
new, murkier forms of protection which discriminate against foreign firms, workers and 
investors often in subtle ways’ (Baldwin and Evenett, 2009: 1).  
 
Baldwin and Evenett subsequently launched the ‘Global Trade Alert’ (GTA) website in 
June 2009 (accessible under http://www.globaltradealert.org/). Its ‘mission’ was to 
‘provide information in real time on state measures taken during the current global 
economic downturn that are likely to discriminate against foreign countries’ (GTA, 
2012). GTA also began publishing analysis of protectionist trends as so-called ‘GTA 
Reports’. This was ultimately a ‘naming and shaming’ exercise aimed at holding the 
G20 to their standstill (and future rollback) pledges, supplementing existing monitoring 
initiatives by the WTO, OECD and UNCTAD by rendering ‘murky protectionism’ 
transparent. But despite the fact that the GTA data itself seems to suggest (as 
highlighted above) that the number of trade restrictions imposed each quarter has been 
declining since an early 2009 peak (see Figure 2) the GTA reports have consistently 
stressed the failure of G20 countries to live up to their promises (Evenett, 2009a,b, 
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2011, 2012). In sum, it is clear that both the extent and the threat of protectionism has 
been exaggerated by leading academics (an opinion shared by a number of other 
economists, e.g. Calì, 2009; Suominen, 2009), with the Smoot-Hawley myth 
underpinning the crisis discourse of the GTA and of other leading economists. 
 
To highlight the impact of such pronouncements among policymakers, one need only 
consider how recent WTO, OECD and UNCTAD G20 monitoring reports (carried out 
since the London summit to hold G20 countries to their ‘standstill’ and ‘rollback’ 
commitments) have painted a similarly grim picture. Reports from May 2010 and May 
2011 called for vigilance in safeguarding an open trading system (WTO et al., 2010, 
2011). The most recent such report (from May 2012), however, struck a more alarmist 
tone. It was to note how ‘the past seven months have not witnessed any slowdown in the 
imposition of new trade restrictions’ (WTO et al., 2012: 4) (see above and contrast this 
with the trend in Figure 2).9 Moreover, it claimed that ‘[t]he accumulation of trade 
restrictions has become a major concern’, with only 18 per cent of new restrictive 
measures removed (WTO et al., 2012: 6), although later conceding in a footnote that 
‘[t]his may well be an underestimation of the real rate of elimination, as very few G-20 
delegations provided information on the termination of old measures’ (WTO et al., 
2012: 10). Unsurprisingly, Pascal Lamy did not pick up on the degree of uncertainty in 
the WTO, OECD and UNCTAD’s report’s data in a speech (on 7 June) shortly after its 
publication ahead of the Los Cabos G20 summit. Instead, he was to underscore how 
‘[f]or the first time since the beginning of the crisis in 2008, [the monitoring] report is 
alarming’ (Lamy, 2012a). 
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By exaggerating the threat of protectionism and invoking the ghost of Smoot-Hawley, 
such policymakers have also sought to underscore the necessity of concluding the Doha 
Round. This has dovetailed with a particular scholarly narrative we already encountered 
in the second section, which has stressed the value of the Doha Round as a means of 
binding tariff levels and otherwise restricting the scope for protectionism (as perhaps 
best embodied by Hoekman et al., 2010). Thus, while so far I have sought to treat them 
as distinct discourses for analytical purposes, it makes sense at this juncture to 
acknowledge that there is an important degree of overlap between the functions (and 
content) of Smoot-Hawley myth and the bicycle metaphor; stressing the need to avoid 
the ‘past mistakes’ of the Great Depression has reinforced the argument that the 
multilateral ‘juggernaut’ has to proceed apace. For example, in a speech given on 26 
June, in the wake of acknowledging the increasing ‘protectionist threat’ facing the 
global trading system, Lamy (2012b) was to stress that 
 
multilateralism is at a crossroads. […] Either it advances in the spirit of shared 
values and enhanced cooperation, or we will face a retreat from multilateralism, 
at our own peril. A consensus for inaction would simply mean a consensus for 
more pain for all. We must, together, be bolder to cope with growing risks. 
 
CHALLENGING SMOOT-HAWLEY: EXPLAINING (NON-)CONFORMITY 
Few countries have been willing to openly challenge the ‘Smoot-Hawley’ myth – a fact 
reflected in the low incidence of protectionism following the advent of the crisis (see 
above). Some might point to peer pressure – rather than ideational factors – as the 
explanation for this development, although they are often seen as two sides of the same 
coin in constructivist IR/IPE literature (see, for example, Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). 
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In this latter vein, I would contend that the rhetorical ‘coerciveness’ of the Smoot-
Hawley myth (to use the terminology of Krebs and Jackson, 2007) – in other words, its 
power over actors regardless of whether these internalise them or not, given the lack of 
an alternative discourse – played a big role in allowing countries to pressure their peers 
into not adopting import-restricting measures. It therefore follows that where this 
discourse has been seriously contested peer pressure will be a lot less effective at 
constraining protectionism. In this section I will show how this is what occurred in the 
case of Argentina. 
 
Argentina’s trade policy also underscores the limitations of using just endogenous trade 
theory to explain free trade since the start of the crisis, which is premised on the role of 
increasingly interconnected global supply chains (e.g. Cattaneo et al., 2010; Gawande et 
al., 2011). Indeed, in Table 1 I showed how tariffs have remained fairly stable for all 
economies irrespective of their level of integration into the global economy, while the 
incidence of any NTBs has been very low for non-G20 members and especially sub-
Saharan Africa (see Evenett 2010). Argentina’s decision to introduce significant import 
restrictions during the crisis adds further grist to the mill as it is an emerging economy 
that is heavily reliant on export-led growth (see Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007) and 
would thus stand to lose considerably if its partners adopted retaliatory measures. While 
interest group politics cannot be ignored in studying Argentinean trade policy, the fact 
remains that Argentina’s policy is underpinned by an important set of ideas that have 
mediated elites’ response to the economic crisis (and domestic pressures) and shaped 
their attitude towards the global trading system. Given the limited space here (which 
precludes me from undertaking an in-depth study of several countries’ trade policies), 
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honing in on Argentinean non-conformity sheds light on the wider importance of the 
Smoot-Hawley myth. 
 
Argentina has made increasing use (since 2008) of non-automatic import licensing and 
in January 2012 also introduced a policy of requiring companies to file affidavits for 
prior import authorisation by the government, with the issuing of such permits being 
delayed. Moreover, it has also put in place policies requiring importers to balance 
imports with exports, invest in Argentinean production facilities and increase local 
content. Such visible (and indeed onerous) measures soon attracted the attention of 
Argentina’s peers at the WTO. In March 2012 the policies were roundly condemned in 
a statement issued by 14 delegations (including the US, EU, Japan, Mexico, Thailand, 
Turkey and a number of other G20 members) (ICTSD, 2012a). Criticism was again 
levelled against Argentina in June 2012 by the US (with concerns also raised by 11 
other WTO delegations, including a number of G20 members) with Indonesia also 
coming under some fire for its import policies at the same meeting (ICTSD, 2012b). 
While Indonesia appeared somewhat conciliatory when criticised – stating that is was 
‘reviewing some of these policies’ and agreeing to postpone the introduction of certain 
measures (ICTSD, 2012b) – Argentina has largely resisted pressure so far from its 
peers. Although it did announce in January 2013 that it was scrapping the policy of 
import pre-approval, it has maintained many of the other measures, even as formal 
disputes in the WTO challenging these – lodged by the US, EU and Japan – have 
reached the panel stage (ICTSD, 2013). In criticising Argentina its peers have drawn on 
the Smoot-Hawley myth’s implied link between import protection and global economic 
collapse/stagnation; in the March 2012 statement condemning its policies, WTO 
delegations noted that ‘[i]n light of the shared goal of making every effort to sustain 
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global economic growth, Argentina’s measures, which clearly limit the growth-
enhancing prospects of trade, are particularly troubling’ (cited in ICTSD, 2012a). 
 
There are those who have argued that in recent years ‘Argentina has gone in the 
opposite direction of most successful emerging countries, by refusing to integrate into 
international markets’ (Gallo, 2012: 59). The reality is more nuanced, even if the 
neoliberal policies of the Menem era (1989-1999) – including deregulation of economic 
activity, privatisation, and trade liberalisation under the auspices of the fixed exchange 
rate Convertibility Plan – were thoroughly discredited in the wake of the Argentinean 
financial crisis (2000-2002) (Grugel and Rigirozzi, 2007: 92-4). However, rather than 
closing it off from the world, the alternative set of economic policies that emerged 
under the leadership of President Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) – and have largely 
remained in place under his successor Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Grugel and 
Riggirozzi, 2012: 12) – seek to carve out a role for the state in managing Argentina’s 
integration in the global economy. Crucially, this model implies a strategy of state-led 
export promotion in the agricultural sector through an undervalued exchange rate 
(Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007: 97-106; Richardson, 2009). In the light of the continuing 
vulnerability of Argentina to commodity price fluctuations (Grugel and Riggirozzi 
2012: 15), the government has also pursued industrial policy as a means of diversifying 
its export earnings into the area of manufacturing. This has involved selective tariffs on 
manufactures, as well as subsidies and credit facilities, with the undervaluation of the 
Argentinean peso also contributing to boosting manufacturing exports (Wylde, 2013: 4-
5). 
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A growing consensus among scholars studying Argentina appears to be that this set of 
policies are underpinned by a new policy paradigm, even if such authors have identified 
elements in this of Peronist import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) (1940s-1950s) and 
Menemist neoliberal policies. It is variously called neodevelopmentalism (or its Spanish 
language equivalent, neodesarrollismo) and post-neoliberalism (in the light of a 
pronounced trend amongst left-wing governments in Latin America to reject the 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus) (Grugel and Rigirozzi, 2007, 2012; Wylde 
2013). As argued by Jean Grugel and Pía Riggirozzi (2007: 87) this ‘has involved a 
more dynamic role for the state in the pursuit of growth and social stability’. Indeed, the 
policy of export promotion of agricultural commodities has played a key role in 
subsidising (through export taxes) social welfare programmes and promoting national 
economic development more broadly – with moves towards carving out a similar role 
for manufacturing exports (see above and Wylde 2013). My aim in this article is of 
course not to enter into debates about how to best characterise this emerging policy 
paradigm, but rather to underscore that it represents a departure from pure neoliberal 
precepts in trade (i.e. through selective protectionism in manufacturing). In this aspect it 
betrays a nostalgia for ISI (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2007: 95). Of course, the policy itself 
has also been assisted by a favourable interest group coalition bringing together 
agricultural exporters, the manufacturing sector and trade unions and has been 
underpinned by an international commodity boom (Richardson, 2009; Etchemendy and 
Collier, 2007). However, this does not detract from the fact neodesarrollismo in 
Argentina – while facilitated by a particular constellation of interests and a favourable 
international context – did not simply arise from ‘a series of decisions made in reaction 
to events, or as opportunistic pragmatism’. Rather, it represents a policy paradigm for 
re-interpreting the role of the Argentinean state in economic development (Wylde, 
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2013: 25) and a set of ideas through which interest group politics and global market 
events have been mediated. 
 
This becomes more apparent when we return to the specific subject matter of this 
article, the crisis, where Argentina’s post-neoliberal paradigm has shaped its trade 
policy response. The crisis has led to increased fear of competition from Asian 
emerging economies – given the drop in demand in developed markets (Carranza, 2010: 
5) – and was accompanied by on-going inflation, which has eroded the competitive 
advantage afforded by the previously undervalued exchange rate (Gallo, 2012: 59). In 
the face of pressure from its domestic industry for protection – the proportion of imports 
subject to trade defence measures, which are often initiated in response to interest group 
pressure, has increased by 36.9 per cent since the start of the crisis (Bown, 2012: 39) – 
Argentina introduced non-automatic import licensing on a myriad of industrial products 
as well as the aforementioned ‘trade balancing’ rules (ICTSD, 2012a; see also WTO et 
al., 2012: 44-6). While some have dismissed this as a form of ‘neo-mercantilist’ trade 
policy aimed at improving the country’s trade surplus (Gallo, 2012: 59), the lack of a 
similar trade policy response from most other economies appears to suggest that we 
need to turn to the realm of ideas to explain Argentina’s response to the crisis.  
 
More specifically, I contend that Argentinean policymakers’ post-neoliberal paradigm 
of neodesarrollismo lead them to reject the Smoot-Hawley myth’s policy prescriptions 
and see import protection as a legitimate policy instrument to protect their ‘infant’ 
manufacturing industries – particularly in the face of what they perceived to be an 
unjust trading system which privileges the interests of developed economies. In this 
vein, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner not only defended Argentina’s policy 
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measures as legitimate, but also accused developed countries of hypocrisy (thus 
implicitly underscoring the inequality of the global trading regime): ‘It’s as if there was 
a legal form of protectionism, the one that developed countries engage in, and a populist 
one when it involves emerging economies. […][Protectionism] is also being confused 
with the concept of patriotism and defense of our own interests’ (cited in ICTSD, 
2012c). In another speech to the MERCOSUR summit in Brasilia in December 2012, 
the link between the rejection of the Smoot-Hawley myth’s prescription of unchallenged 
trade liberalisation and the logic of Argentinean neodesarrollismo was rendered even 
more apparent by the Argentinean President. Fernández de Kirchner also highlighted the 
imbalances in the global trading system that Argentinean policy was seeking to remedy:  
For decades the terms of trade between our region and developed countries were 
stacked against us. Now the terms of trade have been favourable for the past 
decade. But this has not been the work of the Holy Spirit […] [W]e have 
achieved this thanks to public policies and to projects which have prioritised 
growth with inclusion […] and which have abandoned the neoliberal policies 
that the Washington Consensus had imposed on the region (author’s translation 
from Fernández de Kirchner, 2012). 
 
One should naturally not overstate the extent to which Fernández de Kirchner is 
rejecting ‘neoliberalism’, the Washington Consensus and its (‘imposed’) policy 
prescription of trade liberalisation. After all, Argentina’s proclaimed successes stem 
from a state-led policy of integration into the global economy. In this respect Argentina 
appears to have adopted a very similar developmental paradigm to other emerging 
powers, which have also sought to re-articulate a role for the state while adopting some 
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neoliberal policy prescriptions (see Ban and Blyth, 2013). This underscores my 
argument in this section (borrowed from a broader literature on Argentinean political 
economy) that, while not neglecting the important constellation of interests and global 
economic context that facilitate neodesarrollismo (see Richardson, 2009; Etchemendy 
and Collier, 2007), Argentinean trade policy has to be understood through the lens of 
particular policy ideas. This allows me to highlight how Argentina’s nonconformity in 
the WTO should be understood in terms of its discursive rejection of the (otherwise 
coercive) logic of no alternative associated with current debates on global free trade. In 
other words, Argentina has been able and willing to articulate an alternative in the face 
of exercises of publicly ‘naming and shaming’ WTO members for their import policies 
during the crisis – exercises, one should not forget, that appear to carry considerable 
legitimacy by appealing to a shared narrative about the ultimate necessity of free trade 
(with the Smoot-Hawley myth lurking in the background). In sum, ideas play an 
important role in shaping (non-)conformity with peer pressure over the issue of free 
trade since the start of crisis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I began with a puzzle, how to explain the resilience of free trade despite 
the onset of the 2008 Financial Crisis and subsequent economic recession. I then 
challenged the dominant, rational institutionalist account of mainstream IPE scholars 
and economists, who (in large part) argued that the resilience of free trade is a product 
of the constraining role of the global trading regime embodied by the WTO. My 
argument was that it made little sense to point to policy ‘lock-in’ when most countries 
have had considerable legal leeway to raise tariffs and/or NTBs and appear not to have 
not done so to a significant degree. Endogenous trade policy models pointing to the 
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effects of increasingly interconnected supply chains only tell part of the story. While 
they may explain the reduced demand for protection following the start of the crisis, 
integration into the global marketplace did not always correlate with support for free 
trade, as the significant non-conformity of Argentina showed. As a result, I made a 
constructivist argument that pointed to the important role played by ideas, as articulated 
by distinct actors, in structuring social reality and mediating the response of elites to 
protectionist pressures and temptations – in particular so-called discourses of external 
constraint. I focused on the role of the so-called Smoot-Hawley myth – the idea that the 
Great Depression was caused and/or exacerbated by global protectionism in the 1930s 
that had been initiated in the US – in ruling out any non-liberal response to the Global 
Financial Crisis among most of the world’s trade policymaking elites (especially among 
the G20 and within the WTO). Moreover, the willingness of Argentinean policy elites to 
respond differently to the crisis by implementing very visible and wide ranging import 
barriers was strongly shaped by their explicit rejection of this logic of no alternative. 
 
The conclusions I have reached in this article are still tentative and still in need of 
further refinement. However, I have been able to challenge the idea that it is largely the 
legal or other rational institutional mechanisms of the WTO which guarded against 
protectionism. In this vein, I have been able to advance the cause of those who critically 
argue that we need to take ideas more seriously in the study of the international trading 
system. Much as Wilkinson (2009: 614) bemoans that the crisis discourse ‘obscures the 
search for solutions to the problems that generate tensions in trade negotiations’, so too 
the Smoot-Hawley myth – a highly contested historical narrative – can be seen to 
constrain the debate on policy responses to the current economic crisis. My aim in this 
article has been to expose this discursive straightjacket for what it is: a contestable 
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social construction with considerable political impact. Combined with the, as we have 
seen, questionable idea that it is the WTO’s rules-based system of rational incentives 
which has prevented the descent into protectionism, the Smoot-Hawley myth and its 
associated crisis discourse have resulted in a powerful ideational imperative for 
continued openness. They have also helped to exaggerate the threat of protectionism 
and underscored the need to conclude the Doha Round. The failure to achieve this latter 
objective (at least by the time of writing) is of course evidence of the limitations of my 
constructivist explanation emphasising rhetorical coercion through the Smoot-Hawley 
myth; these ideas have not (yet?) been sufficient to secure an agreement in the Doha 
Round even if they have played a key role in inhibiting non-liberal responses to the 
current crisis. What is particularly noteworthy here is that the Argentina’s discursive 
rejection of the logic of Smoot-Hawley – highlighting the ‘hypocrisy’ of developed 
economies and imbalances in the global trading system – mirrors statements it (and 
other emerging economies) have consistently made in the Doha Round (see, for 
example, Narlikar, 2006). In this sense, it reflects the malaise of emerging powers with 
the current WTO system, as well as the potential for challenging the discourses of 
external constraint deployed in its defence.  
 
However, it is fair to say that the Smoot-Hawley discourse – while not entirely 
unquestioned – still carries considerable legitimacy. This serves to obscure the need for 
a wider debate on how to respond to the crisis and how to shape the present Round of 
multilateral trade talks. In doing so, it entrenches the political economic interests of 
those who benefit from the current trading system’s oft-remarked asymmetry (e.g. 
Payne, 2005; Wilkinson, 2006): delivering trade liberalisation and openness in those 
areas of interest to a number of developed economies while doing little in the way of 
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serving the interests of many developing countries. This is why it is important that 
future research builds on these insights and interrogates the strategic dimension to such 
ideas, that is to say, their instrumental use by policymaking elites. Indeed, the evidence 
considered above has suggested that such elites only turned to the Smoot-Hawley myth 
in late 2008 to legitimate trade openness and the conclusion of the Doha Round (and 
invoked the myth most strenuously during the most uncertain, early days of the crisis, 
see Figure 3); during the boom years of the mid-2000s it would appear to have been far 
more productive to invoke the bicycle metaphor to bring about such an outcome. 
Although the jury is still out on whether this will allow them to bring Doha to a close, 
the fact remains that in the crisis context free trade is widely seen as the only legitimate 
policy response, with those openly choosing not to conform facing widespread censure. 
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NOTES 
                                                     
1 As for the data aggregating the number of NTBs, this data is likely to exaggerate the extent of 
protectionism as it does not consider the actual effect of such discriminatory measures on imports.  Thus, 
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even if we take the 3.8 per cent headline figure as given, of this, a proportion of these measures may well 
have only a very limited effect on trade flows. One final reason the actual figure of affected imports is 
likely to be significantly lower is that this data does not take into account that countries have since 
terminated trade protection measures. 
2 Turmoil in financial markets prompted countries to implement such policies in order to ‘protect’ their 
gold reserves and balance of payments position (Irwin, 2012: 32). 
3 Previous G20 summits had been among Finance Ministers and Central Bank governors. 
4 This submission was endorsed by Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey and Uruguay.  
5 The only dissenting voice was that of the Cuban delegation. 
6 Interviews with members of WTO delegations, Geneva, March 2010. 
7 Samman (2012: 219-21) also points to the role of a related group of financial journalists in invoking 
Smoot-Hawley and the threat of protectionism. 
8 VoxEU is a collaborative online portal set up by the CEPR – an economics think tank based in London 
– which also involves a series of other European economics research organisations and websites (VoxEU 
2011). 
9 Although Figure 2 only covers developments up until the third quarter of 2011 (given the availability of 
data), a figure published subsequently by GTA shows that this trend has been continuing, with the 
number of implemented measures falling below 30 in the second quarter of 2012 (Evenett 2012: 33, 
Figure 2.5). 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 Water in the tariffs of developing countries (all products, simple average), 
2006-2010 
    
Binding 
coverage 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (% in 2010) 
Developing G20 economies 
      Argentina 20 20 20 19 19 18 100 
Brazil 19 19 18 18 18 18 100 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 
India 30* 36 36 36 36 N/A 74 
Indonesia 30 30 N/A 30 30 30 96 
Mexico 22 24 24 25 27 28 100 
Saudi Arabia 7 7 7 6 N/A 7 100 
South Africa 11 11 11 11 11 11 96 
Turkey 19 18 19 N/A 19 19 50 
        Upper middle income countries (excluding G20 members) 
  Albania 1 2 2 2 2 2 100 
Antigua & Barbuda 49 49 49 49 N/A 48 98 
Botswana 11 11 11 11 11 11 96 
Chile 19 19 19 19 19 19 100 
Colombia 30 30 30 30 30 34 100 
Costa Rica 37* 37 36 38 38 38 100 
Cuba 11 11 11 11 11 11 31 
Dominica 49 49 N/A N/A N/A 49 95 
Dominican Republic 26 N/A 28 N/A N/A N/A 100 
Ecuador 10 10 10 11 11 12 100 
Gabon 3* 4 4 4 N/A 4 100 
Grenada 47 47 47 N/A 46 46 100 
Jamaica 42 42 N/A 42 42 42 100 
Jordan 5 6 6 6 6 6 100 
Malaysia 17 16 17 16 N/A 17 84 
Maldives 17 N/A 17 17 16 16 97 
Mauritius 90 90 91 93 93 93 18 
Namibia 11 11 11 11 11 11 96 
Panama 16 16 16 16 N/A 16 100 
Peru 20 20 24 24 24 26 100 
St Kitts and Nevis 70 67 67 67 67 66 98 
St Lucia 53 53 N/A N/A N/A 52 100 
St Vincent & the Grenadines 53 53 N/A N/A N/A 53 100 
Thailand 18 16 N/A 18 18 18 75 
Tunisia 31 N/A 36 N/A 41 42 58 
Uruguay 21 21 21 21 21 21 100 
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Lower middle income countries (excluding LDCs and G20 members) 
Armenia 6 N/A 6 N/A N/A N/A 100 
Belize 47 47 47 47 47 47 98 
Bolivia 32 32 32 30 29 29 100 
Cameroon 62* 62 62 62 N/A 62 13 
Cape Verde N/A N/A 5 5 6 6 100 
Congo 9 9 N/A N/A N/A 10 16 
Cote d'Ivoire -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 33 
Egypt 18* 20 20 19 N/A 20 99 
El Salvador 31* 30 31 31 31 31 100 
Fiji 32 N/A 30 30 29 24 51 
Georgia 0 6 6 6 6 6 100 
Ghana N/A 80 80 80 80 N/A 14 
Guatemala 37* 37 37 36 36 36 100 
Guyana 46 N/A 46 N/A 46 46 100 
Honduras 27* 27 27 26 N/A 26 100 
Moldova 2 N/A 2 2 2 2 100 
Mongolia 13 13 13 13 13 13 100 
Morocco 17 18 20 23 23 27 100 
Nicaragua 36* 36 N/A 35 35 35 100 
Nigeria 106 N/A 106 108 107 107 19 
Pakistan 46 46 46 46 46 46 99 
Papua New Guinea 27 27 27 N/A 27 N/A 100 
Paraguay 24 23 22 23 23 23 100 
Philippines 19 19 19 19 19 20 67 
Sri Lanka 19 19 19 19 20 20 38 
Swaziland 11 11 8 11 11 11 96 
Ukraine -1 N/A 0 1 1 1 100 
Vietnam -5 -5 -5 -1 2 N/A 100 
        Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
     Angola 52 52 52 52 N/A 52 100 
Bangladesh 148 155 154 N/A N/A 155 16 
Benin 16 16 16 17 17 17 39 
Burkina Faso 30 30 30 30 30 30 39 
Burundi 56 56 56 N/A 55 55 22 
Cambodia 5 5 5 N/A N/A 10 100 
Central African Republic 18 18 N/A 18 N/A 18 62 
Chad 62* 62 N/A 62 N/A 62 14 
DR Congo 84 84 84 81 85 N/A 100 
Djibouti 13* 13 13 20 N/A 20 100 
Gambia N/A 83 83 84 89 89 14 
Guinea 8* 8 8 9 9 N/A 39 
Guinea Bissau 37 37 37 37 37 37 98 
Haiti 16 16 16 16 14 4 89 
Lesotho 71 71 71 71 71 71 100 
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Madagascar 14 15 15 16 16 16 30 
Malawi 62 N/A 89 62 63 63 32 
Mali 17 17 17 17 17 17 40 
Mauritania 9 8 N/A N/A 10 N/A 39 
Mozambique 85 87 87 87 87 87 14 
Myanmar 77 77 78 N/A N/A N/A 18 
Nepal 12* 13 13 14 14 14 99 
Niger 32 32 32 33 33 33 97 
Rwanda 71 N/A 68 71 77 77 100 
Senegal 18 18 18 18 18 18 100 
Solomon Islands 65 69 69 N/A 69 69 100 
Tanzania 107 107 107 107 108 108 13 
Togo 68 68 68 68 68 68 14 
Uganda 61 61 61 61 61 61 16 
Zambia 93* 93 93 93 70 93 22 
                
Sources: WTO (2006, 2008b, 2009c, 2010c, 2011b, 2012). 
Notes: *Data is for 2005. Countries with data for fewer than two years are omitted, as are non-WTO 
members for the period concerned. Income groupings are by World Bank criteria for 2012 (World Bank, 
2012), while the LDC grouping is arrived at by UN criteria. The ‘water in the tariffs’ was calculated by 
subtracting the average applied MFN tariff for all products from the average bound tariff rate.
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Table 2 ‘Resisting protectionism’ and the Smoot-Hawley myth: G20 pronouncements 
on trade policy after the crisis 
 
Summit Title of heading Text on protectionism under relevant 
heading 
Washington, DC 
(November 2008) 
‘Commitment to an 
Open Global 
Economy’ 
‘We underscore the critical importance of rejecting 
protectionism and not turning inward in times of 
financial uncertainty.’ 
London (April 
2009) 
‘Resisting 
Protectionism and 
Promoting Global 
Trade and 
Investment’ 
‘World trade growth has underpinned rising 
prosperity for half a century. But it is now falling for 
the first time in 25 years. Falling demand is 
exacerbated by growing protectionist pressures and a 
withdrawal of trade credit. Reinvigorating world 
trade and investment is essential for restoring global 
growth. We will not repeat the historic mistakes of 
protectionism of previous eras’. 
Pittsburgh 
(September 2009) 
‘An Open Global 
Economy’ 
‘Continuing the revival in world trade and 
investment is essential to restoring global growth. It 
is imperative we stand together to fight against 
protectionism.’ 
Toronto (June 
2010) 
‘Fighting 
Protectionism and 
Promoting Trade and 
Investment’ 
‘While the global economic crisis led to the sharpest 
decline of trade in more than seventy years, G20 
countries chose to keep markets open to the 
opportunities that trade and investment offer. It was 
the right choice.’ 
Seoul (November 
2010) 
‘Fighting 
Protectionism and 
Promoting Trade and 
Investment’ 
‘Recognizing the importance of free trade and 
investment for global recovery, we are committed to 
keeping markets open and liberalizing trade and 
investment as a means to promote economic progress 
for all and narrow the development gap. The 
importance of free trade and open markets is 
illustrated by the joint report of the OECD, ILO, 
World Bank and WTO on the benefits of trade 
liberalization for employment and growth. These 
trade and investment liberalization measures will 
help achieve the G20 Framework objectives for 
strong, sustainable and balanced growth, and must be 
complemented by our unwavering commitment to 
resist protectionism in all its forms.’ 
Cannes (November 
2011) 
‘Avoiding 
Protectionism and 
Reinforcing the 
Multilateral Trading 
System’ 
‘At this critical time for the global economy, it is 
important to underscore the merits of the multilateral 
trading system as a way to avoid protectionism and 
not turn inward.’ 
Los Cabos (June 
2012) 
‘Trade’ ‘We are firmly committed to open trade and 
investment, expanding markets and resisting 
protectionism in all its forms, which are necessary 
conditions for sustained global economic recovery, 
jobs and development. We underline the importance 
of an open, predictable, rules-based, transparent 
multilateral trading system and are committed to 
ensure the centrality of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).’ 
Sources: G20 (2008, 2009a,b, 2010a,b, 2011, 2012). 
 
 
